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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom in economics is that trade liberalization will have two effects on labor
market outcomes. On the one hand, firms that face import competition may shrink or even exit
and therefore displace workers. On the other hand, firms that gain access to foreign market
should enter or expand, therefore generating new jobs. While such effects of job creation and
destruction due to international trade are commonly accepted, the recent growing literature on
the ‘China shock’ focuses on the job-reducing effect of surging imports from China or other
low-wage countries on the US labor market (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013; Pierce and Schott,
2016; Acemoglu et al., 2016).1 Much less explored is the job-creating effect of exports. Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2013) begin to explore that issue by including net imports from China in
their robustness analysis. Instead we shall consider total US exports as compared to imports
from China and imports from the rest of the world.
Specifically, this paper provides one of the first accounts of job creation due to the export
expansion in the United States, at the industry and the commuting zone levels. The United
States is among the leading exporting countries in the world trading system: in 2014, the value
of its merchandise exports reached more than 1.6 trillion US dollars, second only after China.
Figure 1 illustrates real merchandise exports and manufacturing exports for the US over 1991 to
2011 (in 2007 US dollars). It shows that either measure of US exports more than doubled over
these two decades, from 600 billion or less in 1991 to more than 1.2 trillion dollars in 2011. No
doubt such an expansion in export value generated increased demand for labor. However, the US
export expansion was not evenly distributed across industries. Figure 2 lists the top industries
1Notable exceptions include Dauth, Findeisen, and Suedekum (2014), who use the German trade and labor
data to show that the rise of the East (Eastern Europe and China) caused substantial job losses in regions
exposed to import competition, while it also led to strong employment gains in regions that are more export
oriented. Their results are driven almost entirely by the rise in Eastern Europe, however, and not by China.
Costa, Garred and Pessoa (2016) consider explicitly the employment effects on Brazil of both imports from
China and exports to China. They find that local labor markets more affected by Chinese import competition
experienced slower growth in manufacturing wages. However, local labor markets experiencing larger growth in
Chinese demand have gained through faster wage growth and shifts in the local economy towards formal jobs.
See also Liang (2018) who studies both U.S. imports and exports.
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that have experienced the largest increase in export value during 1991 - 2007. Among 392
revised SIC manufacturing sectors, semiconductors experienced the largest increase in export
value during 1991-1999, while motor vehicles and petroleum refining have been the champion of
export expansion in the period 1999-2007.2 These top categories reflect America’s comparative
advantage and grew much faster than many other categories, some of which even saw reductions
in exports, therefore creating large variation for our estimation.
[Figure 1 and Figure 2 here]
Empirically, it is not easy to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of export expansion
due to endogeneity. While increased access to foreign markets drives up demand for labor
employment, domestic supply shocks such as new technology or TFP growth will also promote
exports, and quite possibly reduce employment, causing difficulty in identification. Uncontrolled
(often unobserved) domestic demand shocks, too, can be expected to affect export value and
labor employment simultaneously. Lack of plausible instruments probably explains the limited
empirical evidence on the employment effects of both exports and imports.
To deal with endogeneity, we adopt two instruments. First, we follow the spirit of Autor,
Dorn and Hanson (2013, henceforth ADH) to look at the export expansion of eight other high-
income countries.3 This is based on the assumption that these high-income countries face
similar demand shocks for their sales into foreign countries as does the United States in its
exports to those countries. The second instrument that we adopt in this paper relies on a more
careful modeling of US exports to each foreign market, based on a CES framework. The export
equation that we obtain includes a term that captures the exports of other countries to each
foreign market (similar to our first instrument), and in addition, it includes the tariffs faced by
the United States and all other countries selling in that market. Thus, we construct a second
2As a comparison, Figure A.1 in the online Appendix presents the top import SIC categories that have
experienced the largest increase in volume from China.
3ADH (2013) instrument the US import penetration from China using eight other high-income countries’
import penetration from China. These countries are: Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New
Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland.
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instrument as the predicted US exports based on foreign demand (except from the US), tariffs
that the US faces, and the tariffs that other competing countries face in each foreign market. We
likewise use two instruments on the import side: the first is the ADH instrument based on the
eight other countries imports (from China or the rest of the world), and the second is predicted
US imports incorporating its own change in tariffs, especially the establishment of Permanent
Normal Trade Relations with China after its accession to the WTO in 2001, as analyzed by
Pierce and Schott (2016) and Handley and Limao (2017).
On the import side, we find that both the ADH instrument and tariffs used in our second
instrument, reflecting China’s PNTR status within the US, perform very well in the first-stage
regressions. That is, both these instruments contribute to the identification of US imports from
China. Interestingly, however, adding the tariff information does not have a substantial further
effect on the employment losses due to US imports from China. This finding suggests that the
ADH instrument based on China’s exports to other countries already incorporates the effects
of its WTO accession, in addition to other policy changes in China such as reform of state-
owned enterprises, etc. All these changes create a quasi-natural experiment that ADH exploit
to measure the ‘China shock’. In contrast, the analogous instrument on the export side to that
used by ADH, which is the export expansion of eight other high-income countries, does not
strongly identify US exports to China, and neither does China’s own tariff cuts. US exports to
the rest of the world are better identified when using the eight other countries exports to the
rest of the world and those tariff changes, but still, there is not the large-scale policy reform at
work that we rely on to identify Chinese imports.
With this qualification in mind, our empirical results show important job gains due to US
export expansion. Based on the industry level estimation, our preferred results show that US
export expansion to the world net of import penetration from China and the rest of the world
actually led to a net gain of 497,000 jobs in the first decade of 1991-1999, while it led to a
net loss of 117,000 jobs for the second period 1999-2011. Over the entire 1991-2011 period,
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therefore, job gains largely offset job losses, with a net gain of 379,000 jobs. While these results
put the job losses created by Chinese imports into a useful perspective, a second qualification is
that the job gain and losses can occur in different geographic locations, so incorporating exports
does not eliminate the localized job losses and gains that occur in different regions.
To investigate these localized job gains and losses, we also explore the variations across US
commuting zones in their exposure to imports and exports. . We find consistently a large
job creating effect of export expansion (but with the same qualification just noted, that these
gains can occur in different commuting zones than the job losses). In the first period, our
preferred specification shows that job gains from export expansion largely offset the job losses
from import penetration, resulting in a net gain of 379,000 jobs (just like we find for the entire
period in the industry estimates). In the second period, export expansion continues to create
large gains around 1200,000 jobs, however, due to the large job losses from import penetration,
this leads to a net loss of 447,000 jobs. Over the entire 1991-2011 period, this leads to a slight
net loss of 68,000 jobs. Other specifications using alternative instruments or the estimation
method of Borusyak, Hull and Jaravel (2018) lead to estimates that vary substantially around
that preferred specification.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces our empirical strategy,
the specifications we use and the two types of instruments we construct. Section 3 presents the
estimation results at the industry level and the quantitative employment implications. Section
4 introduces the analysis at the local commuting zone level. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Strategy
2.1 Specification
To identify the effect of import and export exposure on manufacturing employment, we adopt
the following empirical specification as in Acemoglu et al. (2016), but expand to incorporate
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trade beyond US imports from China:
∆ln(Lst) = αt + β1∆IP
us,c
st + β2∆IP
us,row
st + β3∆EP
us,c
st + β4∆EP
us,row
st + Zs0Γ + st, (1)
where ∆ln(Lst) is the annual log change in employment in industry s over time period t, and
∆IP us,kst and ∆EP
us,k
st measure the annual change in US import and export exposure, respec-
tively, for China (k = c) and the rest of the world (k = row). Zs0 is a row vector of industry-
specific controls such as the number of production workers and nonproduction workers at the
start of period, and other controls that we will discuss in detail in later sections, with the column
vector of coefficients Γ. We expect that β1, β2 < 0 as imports reduce employment, and β3, β4
> 0 as exports increase employment.
Following Acemoglu et al. (2016), we fit this equation for stacked first differences cover-
ing two subperiods 1991-1999 and 1999-2011 (which we call ‘decades’), while for robustness we
sometimes shorten the latter subperiod to 1999-2007 prior to the global financial crisis. All
variables in changes are annualized and the regression also includes a dummy for each period
αt and is estimated using the initial year (1991) industrial employment share as weights. For
US employment changes we use the County Business Patterns (CBP) for the years 1991, 1999,
2007, and 2011. We use the same data coverage as Acemoglu et al. (2016) and follow their
steps to merge the data into 392 manufacturing industries. For additional industry level in-
formation within the manufacturing sector, such as wages for example, we use the NBER-CES
Manufacturing Industry Database for the same years 1991, 1999, 2007.4
Measuring Import Exposure: The change in the industry level import penetration from
China is measured as
∆IP us,cst ≡
∆Mus,cst
Yst0 +Mst0 −Xst0
, (2)
where s denotes 392 manufacturing industries in the SIC classification, and ∆Mus,cst denotes the
change in US imports from China in industry s for the time period t (t is either 1991-1999,
or 1999-2011, and in some cases 1999-2007). To normalize, ∆Mus,cst is divided by the initial
4The NBER-CES database ends at the year 2009.
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domestic absorption in the US, which consists of industry real shipments, Yst0 , plus industry
real net imports, Mst0 − Xst0 , both at initial year t0 = 1991 and deflated by the Personal
Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index. This variable therefore measures the actual
increase in import exposure by each US manufacturing industry s.
We extend the method above to capture import penetration in the United States from the
rest of the world (ROW), by defining:
∆IP us,rowst ≡
∆Mus,rowst
Yst0 +Mst0 −Xst0
, (3)
as US imports from the rest of the world (not including China) measured relative to initial in-
dustry absorption. We can naturally sum the above variables to obtain total import penetration
into the United States as ∆IP usst = ∆IP
us,c
st + ∆IP
us,row
st .
Measuring Export Exposure: To capture the industrial exposure to export expansion, we
use analogous measures to the above variables, where we construct the change in exports relative
to initial industry shipments:
∆EP us,jst ≡
∆Xus,jst
Yst0
, (4)
where ∆Xus,jst in the numerator measures the change in U.S. exports to country j. For example,
∆EP us,cst measures changes in export exposure of industry s between t-1 and t, defined as changes
in US sector exports to China, divided by the initial sectoral shipments Yst0 . Thus, EP
us,j
st is
a measure of export intensity, capturing the share of export value relative to total industrial
output. Alternatively, when j = row then we are interested in measuring the total US export
expansion to the rest of the world, and if j is absent then we are measuring US export exposure
to the entire world, ∆EP usst = ∆EP
us,c
st + ∆EP
us,row
st .
2.2 Instrumental Variables
Equation (1) is subject to endogeneity of the trade exposure measures. Suppose there is a
positive domestic demand shock that increases imports and decreases exports, while raising
employment. Then the OLS coefficients on imports would be biased up, while the OLS estimates
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on exports would be biased down. On the other hand, a US supply shock that is labor saving
will reduce employment, raise output and likely reduce imports, but raise exports, which will
also bias up the OLS coefficient for import exposure while biasing down the coefficient for export
expansion. To address this endogeneity concern, we should use instrumental variables that are
not correlated with US shocks.
2.2.1 ADH-style IVs
Our first set of instruments follows the approach of ADH (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2016).
We will use the imports of eight other high-income countries from China (and from the rest of
the world), which is intended to reflect China’s rising comparative advantage (and likewise from
the rest of the world) and falling trade costs in these sectors that are common to high-income
importing countries.
∆IP oth,cst ≡
∆M oth,cst
Yst0 +Mst0 −Xst0
, (5)
where ∆M oth,cst measures the change in other countries’ imports from China in industry s during
the period t by these eight other nations, which is then normalized by the initial US sectoral
absorption. The validity of this instrument relies on the assumption that high-income countries
are similarly exposed to import competition that is driven by the supply shock in China, while
the industry import demand shocks are uncorrelated between these eight countries and the
United States.
For import penetration from the ROW, we form the instrument
∆IP oth,rowst ≡
∆M oth,rowst
Yst0 +Mst0 −Xst0
, (6)
where the numerator is the eight other countries’ imports from the rest of the world (not
including China or the US) in sector s and year t, again measured relative to initial sectoral
absorption in the US. And for US global imports, we have the associated instrument as ∆IP othst =
∆IP oth,cst + ∆IP
oth,row
st .
On the export side, we aim to identify the impact on US employment from foreign demand
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shocks: those shocks would lead to a rise in exports and employment that is not contaminated
by other shocks in the US market. Our first instrumental variable for export exposure uses the
export expansion of eight other high-income economies to China (for k = c), and to the rest of
the world (for k = row) except the United States:
∆EP oth,kst ≡
∆Xoth,kst
Yst0
, k = c, row. (7)
And for US global exports, we have the associated instrument as ∆EP othst = ∆EP
oth,c
st +
∆EP oth,rowst .
Using other advanced nations’ exports to instrument for the US exports closely follows
the idea of ADH (2013) and is intended to reflect common foreign demand shocks that drive
exports of both the US and the eight other high-income countries. The identification relies on
the exogenous component of United States export growth that stems from the world’s rising
demand for goods in these sectors. This could be due to income growth of emerging economies
since the 1980s, when many countries experienced fast growth and moved from low income to
middle-income countries, notably China and India. Income growth from emerging economies
drives demand for high-quality consumption goods from high-income countries (Costa, Garred
and Pessoa, 2016). Furthermore, emerging economies (China and other newly industrialized
economies) are increasingly involved in global supply chains due to the disintegration of the
production process (Feenstra, 1998). Increasing production capacity drives up their demand for
capital goods, which are largely supplied by high-income countries (Eaton and Kortum, 2001).
Admittedly, our identification on the export side does not benefit from a quasi-natural
experiment such as the economic reforms in China that ADH use to identify the China import
shock. Rather, we are relying on the idea of foreign demand shocks that are correlated between
US exports and those of other high-income countries selling to the same foreign markets.5 It
is possible, however, that export expansion may also reflect supply-side shocks in the United
States. That potential correlation with supply-side shocks will be apparent in our derivation of
5In the online Appendix, Table A.1, column (3), we present evidence that these foreign demand shocks are not
substantially correlated with US domestic demand shocks, so this instrument satisfies that exclusion restriction.
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the export equation, in the next subsection. In terms of estimation, a US supply shock that
is labor saving will reduce US employment but raise exports, resulting in an under-estimated
OLS coefficient of exports on employment. On the other hand, a US supply shock that expands
product variety tends to increase both exports and employment, therefore resulting in an over-
estimated OLS coefficient of exports on employment. So in the following subsection we will
propose a method of correcting for such supply shocks in the export equation, by using fixed
effects to absorb them.
2.2.2 Gravity-based IVs
We develop a specification of US imports and exports based on a constant-elasticity, monopolistic
competition framework. That trade equation will provide a method to test and control for US
supply shocks, and from which we obtain a second set of IVs for imports and for exports.
Prior to China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, China faced uncertainty in the US tariff
that was applied. Subject to an annual vote in the US Congress, China could receive the
most-favored-nation tariff (MFN) of the WTO (or what is known as “permanent normal trade
relations”, PNTR, with the US), but this outcome was not guaranteed. If the US Congress would
have not approved normal trade relations, then China would have faced the so-called ”column
2” tariff from the US tariff schedule as is applied to other Communist countries. Once China
joined the WTO, the risk of facing the column 2 tariff disappeared. Pierce and Schott (2016)
show that the difference between the column 2 and the MFN tariffs – or the tariff ”gap” – is a
predictor of the growth in China’s exports across industries, and therefore, reduced employment
in the United States. Whether or not this source of Chinese export growth is additional to the
growth in China that is reflected in its exports to other countries, as captured by the ADH
instrumental variable, remains to be seen, however. Because the ADH instrument is a reduced
form variable representing all the policy changes in China, we will need to assess the extent to
which that instrument incorporates China’s WTO accession and PNTR with the United States.
On the export side, Caliendo et al. (2017) show that from 1990 until 2011 both MFN
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tariffs and the preferential tariffs have fallen by nearly 9 percent, most of which was driven
by substantial trade liberalization in emerging and developing economies. Notable examples
include China’s accession into the WTO in 2001, which lowered its own average import tariff
from above 15 percent to below 9 percent within just a few years; and the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which integrated production chains and the flow of consumer
goods across the continent of North America. Romalis (2007) finds a substantial increase in
the trade volume and output among the United State, Canada and Mexico, particularly in the
products that were previously highly protected.
Inspired by these observations, our second instrument for the US import and export exposure,
denoted by ∆IP pre,kst and ∆EP
pre,k
st , is constructed as the predicted US imports from China or
exports to China (for k = c) or the rest of the world (for k = row). This prediction will
be made based in part on demand-shift variables that are identical to the ADH instruments
∆IP oth,kst and ∆EP
oth,k
st , and in addition, to reductions in US import tariffs and in tariffs faced
by the US exporters and their competitors selling in foreign countries. We derive this new set
of instruments first for US exports, while deriving a similar set of instruments for US imports
in the online Appendix.6
Predicting US Exports: To predict US exports, we start from a simple symmetric CES
equation as in Romalis (2007),
Xus,jsvt
X i,jsvt
=
(
wusst d
us,jτus,jst
wistd
i,jτ i,jst
)1−σ
, (8)
where: Xus,jsvt is the US exports to country j of variety v in industry s; X
ij
svt is the exports from
country i to j; wusst and w
i
st are the relative marginal costs of producing varieties of Industry
s in the United States and country i; τus,jst and τ
i,j
st are ad valorem import tariffs imposed by
importer j on exports from the United States or from country i; and dus,j and di,j are the bilateral
distance or other trade costs from the United States or exporting country i to importing country
6To take into account the uncertainty that China faced in its US tariff prior to its accession to the WTO, on
the import side we include an additional variable to capture the industry-level export growth from China to the
US due to the removal of trade policy uncertainty. See the Appendix for details.
11
j. Finally, σ denotes the elasticity of substitution.
Suppose that there are N ist identical product varieties in industry s produced and exported
by country i. We can re-arrange the above equation by multiplying both sides by N ist and
summing over a set of countries i 6= us:
Xus,jsvt
∑
i 6=us
N ist
(
wistd
i,j
)1−σ
=
(
wusst d
us,jτus,jst
)1−σ∑
i 6=us
N istX
i,j
svt
(
τ i,jst
)σ−1
. (9)
We are free to specify the set of countries i 6= us in these summations, and for convenience we
will choose to sum over the same eight high-income countries used by ADH (2013).
Multiply this equation by Nusst , and denote the total sectoral exports from the United States
and country i to country j as Xus,jst ≡ Nusst Xus,jsvt and X i,jst ≡ N istX i,jsvt, respectively. After a few
re-arrangements, we can get:
Xus,jst =
[
Nusst
(
wusst d
us,jτus,jst
)1−σ∑
i 6=usN
i
st (w
i
std
i,j)
1−σ
](∑
k 6=us
Xk,jst
)∑
i 6=us
X i,jst∑
k 6=usX
k,j
st
(
τ i,jst
)σ−1
, (10)
where we multiply and divide by
∑
k 6=usX
k,j
st for convenience.
Taking logs of the above equation, we obtain:
lnXus,jst = α
us
st + δ
us,j + ln(τus,jst )
1−σ + ln
[∑
i 6=us
X i,jst∑
k 6=usX
k,j
st
(
τ i,jst
)σ−1 ]
+ ln
(∑
k 6=us
Xk,jst
)
+ jst,
where αusst = ln
(
Nusst (w
us
st )
1−σ) and δus,j = (1−σ) ln(dus,j). The former variable is a fixed-effect
that reflects a US supply shock (i.e. US export variety and the marginal costs of production) and
can be proxied by a set of sector and year fixed effects or their interactions.7 The latter fixed-
effect δus,j reflects distance to the destination market and all other sector- and time-invariant
trade costs. The term jst = −ln
(∑
i 6=usN
i
st (w
i
std
i,j)
1−σ)
is an unobserved error, reflecting the
supply shocks in all other source countries.
Empirically, we can therefore use the following specification:
lnXus,jst = α
us
st + δ
us,j + β1 ln(τ
us,j
st ) + β2 ln(T
j
st) + ln
(∑
k 6=us
Xk,jst
)
+ jst, (11)
7A reduction in wusst reflects an improvement in productivity (a supply shock) that may increase exports and
decrease labor employment simultaneously. An increase in Nusst reflects an expansion in US product variety that
may increase both exports and labor employment simultaneously. We especially want to control for the latter
product variety effect, since it would overstate the OLS coefficient of US exports on employment.
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where β1 = (1 − σ) < 0 and β2 = (σ − 1) > 0. So from the demand side, the US exports of
good s to country j are determined by three items aside from the fixed effects: the first is the
import tariffs imposed by j on US exporters (τus,jst ); and the second is a measure of country j’s
average import tariffs on all non-US imports of good s, T jst ≡
[∑
i 6=us
Xijst∑
k 6=usX
k,j
st
(
τ i,jst
)σ−1] 1σ−1
.
This term captures the substitution between US export products and their competitors, with
higher levels of T jst raising demand for US exports.
8
The final term in the export equation is the total imports by j from other exporters(∑
k 6=usX
k,j
st
)
. As mentioned, we choose to sum over the same eight high-income countries
used by ADH, which we are free to specify in this derivation. This means that this final term,
after taking a long difference and dividing by initial industry shipments, is identical to our
first instrument ∆EP oth,kst , which we refer to more briefly as the OTH instrument for the eight
other high-income countries used by ADH. Our second instrument for US exports, ∆EP pre,kst ,
is constructed as the predicted US exports as specified by equation (11), again after taking a
long difference and dividing by initial industry shipments, so this instrument incorporates OTH
as well as tariffs. It follows that the difference this second instrument and OTH comes entirely
from the tariff terms appearing in (11) and from the fixed effects. Crucially, we do not include
the fixed effects αusst when constructing the prediction ∆EP
pre,k
st , so that it is not contaminated
by US supply shocks. It follows that the difference between the two instruments ∆EP pre,kst and
∆EP oth,kst comes entirely from the tariff terms in appearing in (11).
Gravity-based Instruments: To construct our instruments, there are several steps. First,
we estimate equation (11) at the 6-digit HS level across importing countries j. The data and
estimation results are provided in the online Appendix (Table A.1 columns (1)-(3) for exports
and columns (4)-(5) for imports). Note that for all regressions we constrain the coefficient for
the term reflecting the exports or imports of the eight other countries, ln(
∑
k 6=usX
j,k
st ), to be
unity. This ensures that this term captures exactly the OTH instrument as used by ADH on
8Note that the difference between the tariffs on US imports and the multilateral tariff term comes from the
deviation from MFN tariffs (i.e. preferential tariffs due to free trade agreements, for example).
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the import side.
We then predict US exports to country j for each HS6 products g, X̂us,jgt . After that,
we aggregate the predicted exports across export destinations to get the US industry exports,
denoted as X̂usgt . To facilitate the comparison with the effect of import exposure and employment
changes, we construct our export exposure and the instrumental variables at the revised SIC
(standard industrial classification) level that has been adopted by ADH (2013) and Acemoglu
et al. (2016). The US export data at 6-digit HS product level could be readily converted to the
revised SIC product level by adopting the crosswalk (with weights) in Acemoglu et al. (2016),
ending up with export values for 392 revised 4-digit SIC codes, covering each year from 1991 to
2011, which we denote accordingly as X̂us,kst =
∑
g∈s ωgsXˆ
us,k
gt , where k = c, row, and s denotes
the SIC sector, while ωgs is the weights used in matching HS product g to SIC industry s.
We apply similar steps to predict US imports from China or the rest of the world (for
k = row). Put these together, we have the second sets of instruments as:
∆EP pre,kst ≡
∆X̂us,kst
Ys,t0
, and ∆IP pre,kst ≡
∆M̂us,kst
Yst0 +Mst0 −Xst0
, (12)
which is at the revised SIC industry level and k = c, row. For US global exports and imports,
we construct the associated instruments as ∆EP prest = ∆EP
pre,c
st + ∆EP
pre,row
st , and ∆IP
pre
st =
∆IP pre,cst + ∆IP
pre,row
st .
Based on equation (11), our second instrument for US exports, ∆EP pre,kst , is composed of
two components. The first component is the OTH instrument, which reflects exports by the
eight other advanced economies to their foreign markets. The second component reflects the
tariff terms (i.e. the tariffs faced by the US exporters and the tariffs faced by the eight other
exporting countries), which we often refer to as TAR. The contribution of the tariffs can be
obtained by taking the difference between the PRE and OTH instruments:
∆EP tar,kst ≡ ∆EP pre,kst −∆EP oth,kst . (13)
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and likewise on the import side:
∆IP tar,kst ≡ ∆IP pre,kst −∆IP oth,kst , (14)
where we use k = c for China and k = row for the rest of the world. We will use the OTH term
and TAR terms simultaneously as the instruments for the endogenous trade shocks.
Table 1 summarizes the main variables of interest, including the actual changes in US imports
from China and the rest of world, US global exports, along with the mean changes in the various
instruments we shall use.9 On the import side, we see that the PRE instrument rises at nearly
the same rate as the OTH instrument for China, but somewhat more slowly than the OTH
instrument for the ROW in the second period (1999-2007 or 1999-2011). On the export side,
the PRE instrument rises at nearly the same rate as the OTH instrument for China in the
first period, but somewhat more slowly in the second period, while for the ROW the PRE
instrument rises more slowly than the OTH instrument in both periods. In other words, tariff
reductions in the eight other high-income countries and the ROW – especially in the second
period – apparently lead to more growth of trade between them than between the ROW and
the United States, so that the growth of the OTH instruments for imports and exports exceed
the growth of the PRE instruments. Of course, it is not (only) the mean values of these IVs
that determines their usefulness in explaining actual trade and employment changes, but also
their correlations across industries with those changes.
[Table 1 about here]
2.3 First Stage Results
Table 2 reports the first stage results of regressing endogenous import and export exposure on
our constructed instruments. For the sake of brevity, we will only report results using the full
sets of instruments, and report the Sanderson-Windmeijer (S-W) multivariate F-statistics at
the bottom of each column.
9All these mean changes are computed by weighting the industry changes by 1991 industry employment.
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[Table 2 about here]
Column (1) shows the first stage results for US exports to China (∆EP us,c). For this
particular variable only, it can be seen that none of the constructed instruments have explanatory
power. The F-stat is only 6.12, indicating weak identification. The explanation for this finding,
as already noted, is that our identification on the export side is not based on a quasi-natural
experiment such as the economic reform in China that is used by ADH to identify the China
import shock. US exports to China are not well-explained by any of our instruments. In
contrast, column (2) shows strong and significant contributions from both the OTH and TAR
instruments, ∆IP oth,c and ∆IP tar,c, in explaining US imports from China. Note that we expect
the coefficients for both these terms to have a value of unity, since the tariff term has incorporated
the estimated elasticities into the formula.10 That is exactly we obtain in column (2), and the
first stage F-stat is 40.23, well above the Stock-Yogo critical value.
Column (3) examines the first stage results for US exports to the rest of world (∆EP us,row).
In this case, both instruments ∆EP oth,row and ∆EP tar,row have significant and positive effects
on US exports, and the F-stat is 18.45. Column (4) looks at the first stage results for US
imports from the rest of world (∆IP us,row), which shows that other eight country’s imports
from the rest of world (∆IP oth,row) has significant effect while the coefficient of (∆IP tar,row)
is positive but not significant. The last two columns examine the instruments for US global
exports (∆EP us) and global imports (∆IP us). Again, our constructed instruments strongly
predicts the endogenous variables and the first stage F-stats are above the critical value.
To summarize, the first stage results in Table 2 indicate that predicted exports using both
the OTH term (∆EP oth,row) and the tariff term (∆EP tar,row) are good instruments for US
global exports, while the predicted exports to China using either the OTH term (∆EP oth,c) or
the tariff term (∆EP tar,c) are not good instruments for US exports to China. For US imports
from China, both the OTH term (∆IP oth,c) and the tariff term (∆IP tar,c) are highly significant,
10That is, ∆IP tar,cst reflects βˆ1∆ ln(τ
c,us
st ) + βˆ2∆ ln(T
c
st) + βˆ3GAP
c
st, as indicated in equations (14) and (A.6)
in the online Appendix.
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but for US imports from the rest of the world only the OTH term (∆IP oth,row) is significant.
3 Estimation Results
3.1 Benchmark
Based on the first stage results presented in last section, Table 3 experiments with our benchmark
regression as specified in equation (1), with different sets of endogenous trade shock variables
and corresponding instruments. We focus on stacked first differences over the two subperiods
1991-1999 and 1999-2011, while reporting the estimation results over 1991-2007 in the online
Appendix.11 To control other economic fluctuations that are correlated with trade shocks, we
follow Acemoglu et al. (2016) and include three groups of controls. The first is a set of dummies
for 10 one-digit broad manufacturing categories, which allows for differential trends across these
one-digit sectors. Second, we consider sectoral controls drawn from the NBER-CES database,
including the share of production workers in sectoral employment, the log of the industrial
average wage, the ratio of capital to value added (all measured in 1991), and computer and high
tech equipment investment and pretrend variables in 1990 as a share of total 1990 investment.
Finally, we also include secular trends to control for the decline in the US manufacturing sector
since the 1950s and the decline in manufacturing employment since the 1980s. Also, we add the
change in the industry’s share of total US employment and the change in the log of the industry
average wage, both measured over 1976-1991, as controls for pretrend. We include all three sets
of controls simultaneously and weight the regressions by start-of-period industry employment.
Column (1) presents the OLS estimation results of employment changes, with both import
and export shocks, from China and the rest of world (ROW). Consistent with the findings of
ADH and Acemoglus et al. (2016), import exposure from China exerts a negative impact on
US employment. In contrast, import from ROW (∆IP us,rowst ) has a positive and significant
impact. That surprising positive coefficient is probably due to the general equilibrium effect of
11In particular, we report in the online Appendix a full set of estimation results, including the first stage,
with different sets of IVs (using only OTH or both OTH and TAR instruments) and over longer (1991-2011) or
shorter periods (1991-2007).
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international trade: when imports from China increase, imports from other countries may actu-
ally decrease even while employment is falling, so that the OLS estimates are biased upwards.
Exports to China has a large and significant impact on US employment in these OLS estimates,
while exports to the ROW have only an insignificant impact.
[Table 3 about here]
To correct the bias due to endogeneity, we apply both components of the predicted US im-
ports and exports – i.e., the OTH term and the tariff term – as instruments for each endogenous
variable. The 2SLS result in column (2) shows that the impact of imports from China remains
significant and negative, and becomes larger in magnitude, while impact of exports to China
remains positive and also becomes larger in magnitude, indicating the OLS results understate
the effects of both exports and imports with China. The impacts of trading with the rest of
world (i.e., the coefficients for ∆EP us,rowst and ∆IP
us,row
st ) are both insignificant, however. As
indicated by the first stage F value, column (2) has weak instruments, which primarily comes
from the poor fit for US exports to China, as shown in column (1) of Table 2.
Thus, we modify the specification in column (3) to constrain the coefficients on US exports
to China and to the ROW to be equal, therefore using US exports to the world (∆EP usst )
which is the sum of US exports to China and ROW. This change increases both the AIC and
BIC statistics slightly, and it improves the strength of instruments substantially so that the first
stage F value is now 16.39, well above the Stock-Yogo critical value of 11.39.12 Furthermore, the
Hansen J test has a p-value of 0.52, indicating good exogeneity of the instruments. In addition,
the magnitude of the employment coefficient on global exports, 0.49 in column (3), is quite
reasonable as compared to the magnitude of the employment coefficient on Chinese imports of
0.81.13 Column (3) is therefore our preferred specification. We have used the equality of the
12In the online Appendix Table A.2 that reports estimates over the period 1991-2007, however, the AIC and
BIC values are slightly lower in column (3) than in column (2).
13Notice that without constraining the coefficients on Chinese and rest-of-world exports, the former has a high
coefficient of 2.15, which more than doubles in size to 4.92 in column (6) if rest-of-world exports are dropped.
This indicates a strong positive correlation between US exports to China and the rest of the world, so that it is
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employment coefficients on US exports to China and to the rest of the world to assist in the
identification of these effects.
In column (4), we experiment with further constraining the coefficients on US imports from
China and from ROW to be equal, therefore using US imports from the world (∆IP usst ). In
that case, the AIC and BIC statistics are considerably higher and the Hansen J-test strongly
rejects the exogeneity of the instruments. In column (5), we also impose the same constraints
on the instruments, thus using ∆EP oth,worldst and ∆EP
tar,world
st to instrument for US global ex-
ports (∆EP usst ) , while using ∆IP
oth,world
st and ∆IP
tar,world
st to instrument for US global imports
(∆IP usst ). In this case the Hansen J-stat passes the exogeneity test, but the instrument is weak
as indicated by the S-W F-stat. In summary, we still prefer the export-constrained specification
in column (3) over the other columns.
The final two columns focus on US bilateral trade with China: column (6) uses the full set
of instruments, while column (7) only uses instruments for China. Column (7) has lower AIC
and BIC, but it also suffers from weak instruments.14 As indicated by the 2SLS estimation in
column (7), a 1 percentage point increase in the import exposure to Chinese imports leads to
0.7 percentage reduction in industry employment. On the other hand, a 1 percentage point rise
in exports to China would increase the industry employment by 2.5 percentage point. As we
will show in the next section, although the estimated impact of exports to China is much larger
than that of imports from China, the net impact of bilateral trade with China is still negative
(i.e., net job loss) since the increase in Chinese imports is much larger than the increase in
exports to China. It is worth noting that the first stage regressions in Table 2 show that the
proposed instruments for US exports to China are not significant, so the results in these final
columns should be interpreted with caution.
difficult to disentangle their separate impacts. The same problem does not arise on the import side, where the
employment coefficient of US imports from China is strongly identified whether US imports from the rest of the
world are included or not.
14In the online Appendix A.2 a similar results occurs over 1991-2007, and in that case column (6) fails
exogeneity at the 10% level.
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3.2 Quantifying the Employment Effects
Relying on the estimation results in Table 3, we can evaluate the economic magnitude of trade
shocks on labor employment. The results in our preferred specification column (3) indicate that
a 1 percentage point rise in industry import penetration from China reduces domestic industry
employment by 0.81 percentage points from 1991-2011. This number is only a bit higher than
the point estimate by Acemoglu et al. (2016) for the same period (Table 3, col. (3)). Such job
loss is offset, however, by the job created due to expansion in US exports to China and the ROW:
a 1 percentage point rise in export expansion to the world increases industrial employment by
0.5 percentage points.
To quantify the employment effect, we rely on equation (1), and express the changes in
industrial employment brought about by the increase in imports and exports as:
∆Lt =
∑
s
[
Ls,t
(
1− e−(∆ÎP st+∆ÊP st)
)]
, (15)
where ∆ ˆIP st ≡ βˆ1∆IP us,cst + βˆ2∆IP us,rowst and ∆EˆP st ≡ βˆ3∆EP usst + βˆ4∆EP us,rowst are the
estimated import and exports effects from column (2), while our preferred specification in column
(3) assumes βˆ3 = βˆ4, column (4) further assumes βˆ1 = βˆ2, and columns (5) and (6) have
βˆ2 = βˆ4 = 0. Hypothetically, this equation calculates the difference between the actual and
counterfactual manufacturing employment in year t if there were no changes in import and
export exposure.15
Applying the actual changes in import penetration (∆IPst) and export expansion (∆EPst),
we calculate the net employment changes due to these trade shocks. Moreover, we can compute
separately the effects of imports and exports by using the second-order approximation ex− 1 ≈
x + x2/2. Applying this formula for x = ∆ ˆIP st + ∆EˆP st, x = ∆ ˆIP st and x = ∆EˆP st, we
15We are assuming that when ∆IPst = ∆EPst = 0, then the China shock and export opportunities have
zero impacts on the level of employment, and not just on its difference. In other words, we are assuming that
import penetration and export expansion do not create a common employment effect across industries that we
are omitting in the diff-in-diff specification.
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obtain: ∑
s
Lst
(
1− e(∆ ˆIP st+∆EˆP st)
)
≈
∑
s
Lst
[
(1− e∆ ˆIP st) + (1− e∆EˆP st)− Cst
]
, (16)
where Cst = ∆ ˆIP st∆EˆP st. We interpret the first two terms on the right of this equation as
a decomposition of the total employment impact into that due to imports and that due to
exports, while the third term Cst becomes a weighted cross-moment of the import and export
effects when multiplied by Lst and summed across sectors. If this cross-moment is negative due
to imports reducing employment and exports raising it in most industries, but small, then the
combined effect measured by the left-side of this equation will slightly exceed the sum of import
and export effects on the right.
At the bottom of each column of Table 3, we present the implied job gain or loss for imports
and exports, and for each period separately. Focusing on our preferred specification in column
(3), export expansion to the world net of import penetration from China and from the rest of
the world actually led to a net gain of 497,000 jobs in the first decade 1991-1999, since exports
created more jobs than the jobs destructed by import competition. For the second decade over
1999-2011, it led to a net loss of 117,000 jobs, mainly due to a surge of imports from China
since the coefficient on non-China imports is tiny. Summing these estimates implies over the
whole period 1991-2011 there was a net gain of 379,000 jobs.16 Thus, the job losses due to US
imports from China measured by ADH and Acemoglu et al. (2016) are fully offset by the job
gains due to US exports. If we focus on US bilateral exports and imports with China in column
(7), exports to China is substantially smaller than imports from China, so both periods see net
losses between 138,000 and 183,000 jobs. Over the whole period, trading with China caused
about 322,000 job losses.
As robustness checks, we examine the same specifications in Table 3, but using only the ADH
style instruments (i.e, the OTH instruments), or shortening the sample period to 1991-2007. We
16Looking only at imports, we calculate from column (3) a total job loss of 644,000 jobs over 1991-2011. In
comparison, adjusted by the first stage partial R-squared (0.56), Acemoglu et al. (2016) estimate that import
penetration from China led to about 463,000 job loss during the period 1991-2011 (see their footnote 30). We
are obtaining a higher estimate because we do not adjust by the partial R-squared of the first-stage regressions.
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report the regression results and the associated first stage results in the online Appendix, while
we summarize in Table 4 the implied employment effects associated with our preferred specifica-
tion in column (3) in each case. The top panel reports the case of using OTH instruments only,
for 1991-2007 (the top left) and 1999-2011 (the top right). The bottom panel then reports the
case of using both OTH and TAR instruments. So the bottom right panel corresponds to what
we have already discussed in Table 3 using both instruments. In all cases, there are very strong
job gains due to exports and smaller job losses due to imports in 1991-1999, so in this period
the net gain is about 500,000 to 625,000 jobs. For the later periods, 1999-2007 or 1999-2011, we
estimate more than 500,000 job losses from imports, which are nearly completely offset by strong
job gains due to exports. Moreover, using more restricted instruments (i.e. just OTH) gives
greater net gains than using both OTH and TAR as IVs. An inspection of the regression results
in the Appendix Table A.8, in particular, shows that when using only the OTH instruments
then the coefficient on US global exports is higher than in Table 3, while the coefficient on US
imports from China is lower. Combined with the higher growth of OTH global exports than
PRE global exports in Table 1, it is not surprising that using only the OTH instruments leads to
greater employment gains from exports. By also incorporating tariffs, we are therefore arriving
at slightly lower employment gains due to exports and on net. This finding suggests that the
ADH instrument based on China’s exports to other countries already incorporates the effects
of China’s WTO accession, because including that tariff variable on the import side (reflecting
reduced uncertainty in the US ) does not contribute to any further job losses.
[Table 4 about here]
3.3 Other Industry Outcomes
Next, we explore the impact of trade exposure on other industry outcomes. We follow the
approach in the previous section of reporting results using both OTH and TAR instruments,
as shown in Table 5. The top panel of each table uses the County Business Patterns (CBP)
data while the bottom panel uses the NBER-CES database. Since the NBER data covers years
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up to 2009, so in Table 5 we will focus on the period 1991-2007. Each column represents one
important aspect of labor market outcomes.
In the top panel using CBP data, increasing import exposure reduces employment while
export expansion creates employment (column 1), which can be further decomposed into the
response in the number of establishment (column 2) and the average employment per establish-
ment (column 3). From the coefficient estimates, about 60 percent of the negative impact of
import shock from China is on the intensive margin—the average employment per establish-
ment, while the other 40 percent is on the extensive margin—the number of establishments.
Similarly, 57 percent of the impact of global export shock is on the intensive margin and 43 per-
cent on the extensive margin. Import penetration and export expansion have offsetting effects
on the total industry wage bill (column 4) while the impacts on the log real wage rate are both
positive but insignificant.17 Impacts of non-China imports are always small and insignificant.
Turning to the bottom panel using NBER-CES data, columns (1)-(2) show that import
shock reduces employment of both production workers and non-production workers, with a
greater impact on the former. Export expansion, on the other hand, increases the employment
of both with roughly equal elasticity. Increasing import exposure from China has no significant
effect on real wages of production workers but does reduce wages of nonproduction workers
(columns 3 and 4). In contrast, export expansion increases the real wage of production workers
but has only an insignificant effect on the wage of nonproduction workers. Finally, column (5)
in the bottom panel shows that export expansion increases real industry output while import
competition from China decreases it, though both are not significant.
[Tables 5 about here]
17Acemoglu et al. (2016, Table 5, p. S168) also find a positive and insignificant impact of Chinese import
competition on the real wage rate.
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4 Export and Import Exposure on Local Labor Markets
The industry level results compare changes in relative employment across manufacturing sectors
with different exposure to import penetration and export expansion. In this section, we follow
ADH (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2016) and explore the geographic differences in trade shocks,
based on 722 commuting zones (CZs) that cover the entire US mainland.
We begin by first constructing the Bartik measures of CZ level import and export exposure
as:
∆IPCZit =
∑
s
Lis,t0
Li,t0
∆IPst, and ∆EP
CZ
it =
∑
s
Lis,t0
Li,t0
∆EPst, (17)
where i denotes commuting zone, s denotes SIC manufacturing sectors, ∆IPst and ∆EPst are
sectoral import and export exposure that we have used in the previous sections. So ∆IPCZit
and ∆EPCZit denote the increases in import and export exposures respectively, by commuting
zone i for time period t (either 1990-2000, or 2000-2007/2011). Note that Lis,t0 is the start of
period employment in manufacturing sector s and commuting zone i, while Li,t0 is the start of
period total employment for commuting zone i, including both manufacturing and nonmanu-
facturing employment. The variation in import and export exposures across commuting zones
comes entirely from the differences in local industry structure in employment in the initial year.
Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018) argue that the industry structure in the initial year is the es-
sential instrument that is being used in a Bartik regression. In contrast, Borusyak et al. (2018)
argue that the China shock variable is a valid instrument (under an exclusion restriction) in a
transformed version of the CZ regression that is run at the industry level. They further argue
(following Adao et al. 2018) that the standard errors of the conventional Bartik regression are
under-estimated, which is corrected in this transformed version and which we shall investigate
in this section.
As with the industry measure of trade shocks, the CZ level import and export exposures are
also likely to be subject to endogeneity. We therefore apply the Bartik formula to the industry
level instruments, obtaining commuting zone level instrument for import and export exposure.
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We then estimate the following specification across 722 commuting zones:
∆Lit = βt + β1∆IP
CZ
it + β2∆EP
CZ
it + γX
CZ
it0
+ γr + eit, (18)
where ∆Lst is the annual change in employment share of the working age population in com-
muting zone i over time period t. To be consistent with the industry level specification, we
continue to stack the annualized first differences for the two periods, 1991-1999 and 1999-2007
or 1999-2011. In all regressions, we also include a dummy for each period βt to control for
different time trends, a set of census division dummies to control for regional specific trends, as
well as the initial share of manufacturing workers (in 1991). All regressions are weighted by the
start of period (1991) commuting zone’s share of national population, and the standard errors
are clustered at the commuting zone level.
The first three columns of Table 6 present results for 1991-2011, starting with local effects of
exposure to China imports in column (1). It shows that the impact of CZ level import exposure
from China on the local employment share is negative and significant. Next column (2) shows
that besides the negative effect of imports from China, regional export expansion has a positive
and significant employment effect, while non-China imports has no significant effect. Column
(2) uses the predicted terms of exports to the world (both OTH and TAR terms) as the export
instruments, while in column (3) we instead use a full set of 4 instruments for US exports.
The export exposure is found to have a substantial and significant impact on commuting zone
overall employment. Specifically, taking column (3) as benchmark, a 1 percentage increase in the
average import penetration from China reduces the local employment rate by 1.02 percentage
points. At the same time, a 1 percentage point increase in the average export expansion raises
the local employment rate by 0.98 percentage point.
[Table 6 about here]
In the bottom rows, we report the quantitative employment effects associated with each
column. First, column (1) confirms the ADH finding that import competition at the regional
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level leads to large employment losses, in particular in the second period from 1999 to 2011.
In total, from 1991-2011, China import competition is estimated to cause 2 million job losses
at the commuting zone level. Secondly, column (2) shows that export expansion largely offsets
the job losses due to imports. In the first period, imports from China and imports from ROW
each led to around 500,000 job losses, but they are more than offset by the job expansion due
to exports. In the second period, the job losses due to faster growth of China imports amounts
to about 1.5 million, much higher that that due to imports from ROW, while export expansion
generates about 1 million new jobs. Summing both period together, the net employment change
at the commuting zone level is 548,000 job losses. Finally, in column (3) we use a full set of
instruments for exports. The coefficient estimate for US exports becomes larger, resulting in a
small net employment loss of 68,000 jobs for the whole period.
In a recent paper, Borusyak et al. (2018) argue that the standard errors of the ADH
estimates at the commuting zone level may be under-estimated, because the variance of the
quasi-experimental shocks needs to be accounted for (Adao et al. 2018). They show that one can
transform the commuting zone level regression into a weighted industry-level regression, which
could correct the standard errors. In columns (4)-(6), we follow Borusyak et al. (2018) and
transform all variables by taking their initial-employment-share-weighted average over regions
to obtain the industry-level regressions.18 All coefficient estimates have the expected signs and
the effects of China imports and US exports remain significant. Interestingly, the standard
errors of the transformed regressions have not increased much.19 But notice that the first stage
S-W F statistics are much lower in columns (4)-(6) and are surely more accurate as compared
to columns (1)-(3). For this reason, all the columns will suffer from weak instruments and the
18More specifically, within an industry, we take the weighted average of regional employment changes and trade
shocks using the initial regional employment shares as weights (i.e. using the Bartik weights); see Borusyak et
al. (2018), equations (1)-(4). In practice, since the ADH commuting zone regressions are weighted by working
age population, the industry average also needs to be multiplied by the regional population weights.
19We conjecture this result might be because our regressions also include additional controls such as regional
dummies, time dummies and start-of-period manufacturing share. Borusyak et al. suggest that in this case
one need to further residualize the instruments by regressing regional instruments on the vector of industry
employment share in each region. That means in our case estimating 392 coefficients (since there are 392
manufacturing sectors) using a sample of 722 commuting zones, which we did not pursue.
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results should be interpreted with caution.
Still, if we take the coefficient estimates in columns (4)-(6) and apply them to the commuting
zone level trade shocks, we can estimate the employment effects in same way as in columns (1)-
(3) of Table 6, which are reported in the bottom rows on the right. The results are quite close to
what we have found using the ADH specification on the left, though the job creation effects of
US exports are estimated to be even larger. Taking column (5) for example, in the first period,
US exports generate more than 1.6 million jobs, more than offseting the 900 thousand job losses
due to imports from China and the ROW, while in the second period the job losses due to fast
growth of China imports amounts to about 1.3 million, plus nearly 175 thousand job lossed
due to imports from ROW, which is slightly more than the job gains of 1.3 million due to US
exports. Summing both period together, the net employment change at commuting zone level
is 636, 000 job gains. Column (6) uses the full set of instruments for exports and in this case,
both coefficients for US exports and ROW imports increase, while the net effect remain very
similar to what we obtain in column (5).
Table 6 focused on the overall impact of trade shocks, while in Table 7 we explore the
differential impact of trade exposure on different types of industries within local labor markets.
We follow Acemoglu et al. (2016) and group employment changes into three broad sectors:
exposed sector, nonexposed tradable sector, and nonexposed nontradable sector.20 Empirically,
we interact each of the three sectoral dummies with three types of trade shocks (China imports,
imports from ROW, and US exports). In all regressions, we have included time dummies, census
division dummies, and the initial manufacturing employment share, which are interacted with
the sector dummies. Column (1) of Table 7 focuses on CHN imports, which is consistent to
what has been reported in Acemoglu et al. In particular, the employment effects of import
20We simply adopt the classification by Acemoglu et al. (2016). Admittedly this approach only separates
industries by their exposure to import competition. More specifically, the exposed sector include all manufactur-
ing industries for which predicted import exposure rose by at least 2 percentge points between 1991 and 2011,
and all industries for which the predicted upstream import exposure measure increased by at least 4 percentage
points. Other industries are regarded as non-exposed, which are then further decomposed into tradables and
nontradables.
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competition from China are completely on exposed sectors. Columns (2) and (3) then include
the shocks of ROW imports and US global exports. It shows consistently that US exports have
strongly generated jobs in the nonexposed, nontradable sectors, while interestingly, imports
from ROW destroy jobs in this sector but generate jobs in the nonexposed, tradable sector. In
the bottom panel we provide a decomposition of the employment effect of import and export
shocks (as shown in the bottom panel of Table 6) into the three types of sectors. Job losses due
to China imports are completely in the exposed sector, which amount to about 600 thousands
jobs in the first period and become more than tripled in the second period. On the other hand,
such negative effect of import competition is largely offset by US exports, which create jobs
mainly in the nonexposed, nontradable sector. In a recent study, Fort et al. (2018) find that
US manufacturing firms have increased their non-manufacturing establishments and employed
more non-manufacturing workers. This is consistent with our findings of a strong increase in
nonexposed, nontradable sector employment due to export expansion.
[Table 7 about here]
5 Conclusions
The work of Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), Pierce and Schott (2016), and Acemoglu et al.
(2016) has alerted us to the impact of the China shock on US employment and unemployment.
As exports from China grew rapidly following its WTO accession in 2001, there was a marked
fall in US manufacturing employment. What has not received the same degree of attention
in the literature is the potential for a rise in employment within industries that produce and
benefit from growing US exports. ADH (2013) experimented with using net manufacturing
imports from China, but that variable did not give results that were greatly different from what
they obtained with gross imports from China.
In this paper, we have re-examined the employment impact of US exports, by expanding
the Acemoglu et al. (2016) framework to incorporate trade beyond US imports from China.
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We consider US imports from China and from the rest of the world, along with US exports
to China and to the rest of the world. We construct two types of instruments for all four
trade variables, which are endogenous. The first type of instruments follows the approach of
ADH (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2016), for which we use the imports or exports of eight
other high-income countries with China (and with the rest of the world). Using other advanced
nation’s imports or exports to instrument for the US imports or exports is intended to reflect
common foreign supply shocks or demand shocks that drive imports or exports of both the
US and the eight other high-income countries. The second type of instruments builds on a
constant elasticity, monopolistic competition framework, in which we derive a US export or
import equation that can test and control for US demand and supply shocks. Compared with
the ADH-style instruments, our gravity-based instruments is composed of two components. One
is exactly the ADH instrument, which reflects multilateral trade by eight other high-income
countries, and the other is the tariff term, reflecting the tariffs faced by US and eight other
advanced economies. Our first-stage regressions indicate that the identification of US exports
is on weaker econometric grounds as compared with US imports, since our instruments are not
from any quasi-natural experiment. In comparison, ADH utilize the economic reforms in China
and its accession to the WTO as an exogenous source of the China import shock.
Our results fit the textbook story that job opportunities in exports make up for jobs lost in
import-competing industries, or nearly so. At the industry level, the US exports created enough
jobs to offset the job losses due to import competition, which led to a net gain of 497,000 jobs
in the first decade of 1991-1999; while for the second period 1999-2011, it led to a net loss of
117,000 jobs; over the entire 1991-2011 period, job gains entirely offset job losses, with a net
gain of 379,000 jobs. At the commuting zone level, we also find the job creating effect of export
expansion. In the first period, job gains from export expansion largely offset the job losses
from import penetration, resulting in a net gain of 379,000 jobs (just like the total period in
the industry estimates). In the second period, export expansion continues to create large gains
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around 1200,000 jobs, but due to the large job losses from import penetration, there is still a
net loss of 447,000 jobs. Over the entire 1991-2011 period, job gains and losses are roughly
balanced with a slight net loss of 68,000 jobs. Nevertheless, we stress that workers laid off in
some industries or some local markets may not be in a position to easily shift to another industry
or place, so that even achieving rough balance between jobs lost and created can still generate a
substantial amount of unemployment, or workers no longer in the labor force. This is one reason
to find a smaller net impact of trade on local employment in the commuting zone analysis, and
also less robust estimates. We have only begun to implement the recommendations of Borusyak
et al. (2018) and Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018) for using of Bartik weights at the regional
level, and more work remains to be done.
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Figure 1: US Export: 1991-2011
Note: Red line shows the aggregate export of the United States, while the blue line shows the manufacturing
exports. All values are in billion US$, deflated to 2007 US dollars using the PCE price index. Data source:
UN-Comtrade
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Figure 2: Changes in US Industry Real Exports: 1991-2007
Note: This figure shows the top 8 SIC products in US exports, in terms of changes in real export value for two
subperiods 1991-1999 and 1999-2007. All values are in billion US$, deflated to 2007 US dollars using the PCE
price index. Data source: UN-Comtrade
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
1991-1999 1999-2007 1999-2011
N Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
100 × annual log ∆ in manufacturing employment 392 -0.30 3.49 -3.62 4.15 -4.32 3.85
100 × annual log ∆ in non-manufacturing employment 87 2.46 2.38 1.54 1.59 0.57 1.56
100 × annual ∆ in CHN import exposure 392 0.27 0.75 0.84 1.61 0.66 1.33
PRE instrument for imports ( ∆IP pre,c) 392 0.16 0.39 0.69 1.26 0.65 1.19
OTH instrument for imports (∆IP oth,c) 392 0.19 0.46 0.67 1.19 0.66 1.18
TAR instrument for imports ( ∆IP tar,c) 392 -0.03 0.14 0.02 0.17 -0.01 0.22
100 × annual ∆ in ROW import exposure 392 1.33 2.23 0.593 2.74 0.34 2.12
PRE instrument for imports ( ∆IP pre,row) 392 0.35 2.63 1.53 2.76 1.07 2.31
OTH instrument for imports (∆IP oth,row) 392 0.345 2.66 1.77 3.26 1.30 2.56
TAR instrument for imports ( ∆IP tar,row) 392 0.01 0.52 -0.24 0.80 -0.23 0.59
100 × annual ∆ in CHN export exposure 392 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.26 0.12 0.23
PRE instrument for exports ( ∆EP pre,c) 392 0.05 0.13 0.22 0.49 0.27 0.60
OTH instrument for exports ( ∆EP oth,c) 392 0.08 0.17 0.36 0.79 0.44 0.97
TAR instrument for exports ( ∆EP tar,c) 392 -0.03 0.06 -0.14 0.30 -0.17 0.38
100 × annual ∆ in ROW export exposure 392 0.87 1.49 0.51 2.37 0.36 2.49
PRE instrument for exports ( ∆EP pre,row) 392 0.28 0.84 1.19 2.12 0.92 2.14
OTH instrument for exports ( ∆EP oth,row) 392 0.42 1.66 2.49 4.04 1.89 3.95
TAR instrument for exports ( ∆EP tar,row) 392 -0.15 0.91 -1.30 1.98 -0.97 1.86
Note: For each manufacturing industry, the change in US import (or export) exposure,is computed by dividing 100 × the
annualized increase in the value of US imports (exports) over the indicated periods by 1991 US market value (1991 US industry
output) in that industry. All observations are weighted by 1991 industry employment.
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Table 2: Initial First Stage Results, OTH & TAR IVs, 1991-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆EP us,c ∆IP us,c ∆EP us,row ∆IP us,row ∆EP us ∆IP us
∆EP oth,c -0.04 0.03 0.49 0.76 0.46 0.80
(0.09) (0.21) (0.87) (0.75) (0.87) (0.91)
∆EP tar,c -0.37 0.39 1.78 2.46 1.41 2.89
(0.25) (0.59) (2.59) (2.27) (2.53) (2.77)
∆IP oth,c -0.02 0.99∗∗∗ -0.14 -0.10 -0.16 0.90∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.20)
∆IP tar,c 0.02 1.06∗∗∗ -0.05 -0.61 -0.04 0.45
(0.03) (0.19) (0.43) (0.77) (0.44) (0.84)
∆EP oth,row -0.02 0.09∗ 0.57∗∗ -0.03 0.55∗∗ 0.06
(0.02) (0.05) (0.23) (0.16) (0.22) (0.16)
∆EP tar,row -0.06∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.81∗∗ -0.08 0.75∗∗ 0.14
(0.03) (0.10) (0.37) (0.26) (0.35) (0.27)
∆IP oth,row 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01 0.12∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
∆IP tar,row -0.02 0.01 -0.41∗ 0.11 -0.43∗∗ 0.13
(0.02) (0.04) (0.21) (0.28) (0.21) (0.28)
S-W F-stat 6.12 40.23 18.45 28.40 13.97 29.93
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on three digit SIC industries. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The sample includes 784 obs: 392 SIC manufacturing sectors during two periods (1991-1999 & 1999-2007). All regressions are
weighted by start-of-period employment share of the sector and include decadal dummies. All regressions include controls of
sectoral dummies, trend, and industry initial conditions.
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Table 3: Benchmark Industrial Estimation of US Employment, OTH & TAR IV, 1991-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log change in industry employment, 1991-2011, IVs: OTH & TAR
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆ Global Imports -0.30∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗
(0.08) (0.08)
∆ CHN Imports -0.50∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗ -0.78∗∗∗ -0.79∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.21)
∆ Non-CHN Imports 0.30∗∗∗ 0.11 0.11
(0.10) (0.18) (0.18)
∆ Global Exports 0.49∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.22) (0.22)
∆ CHN Exports 1.37∗∗∗ 2.15∗∗ 4.92∗∗∗ 2.51∗∗
(0.50) (1.00) (1.14) (1.25)
∆ Non-CHN Exports 0.07 0.38
(0.11) (0.25)
# of IV 8 8 8 4 8 4
Hansen J p-value 0.472 0.52 0.018 0.31 0.134 0.292
Min S-W F 6.12 16.39 13.97 9.38 12.64 7.92
S-Y critical value (10%) 11.39 11.39 11.39 10.27 11.39 10.27
AIC 3912.3 3949.5 3965.5 4140.0 4058.2 3977.8 3962.5
BIC 4014.9 4052.1 4063.4 4233.3 4151.5 4071.1 4055.7
Predicted Job Change (1,000) 1991-1999
Import 344 -98 -111 -701 -420 -300 -302
Export 177 578 607 1208 966 304 159
Net 510 479 497 629 605 14 -138
Predicted Job Change (1,000) 1999-2011
Import -135 -521 -533 -554 -317 -610 -615
Export 288 600 411 732 613 748 410
Net 139 91 -117 367 384 177 -183
Predicted Job Change (1,000) 1991-2011
Total Import 208 -619 -644 -1255 -737 -910 -917
Total Export 465 1178 1018 1941 1579 1052 568
Total Net 649 570 379 996 989 191 -322
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on three digit SIC industries. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The sample includes 784 obs: 392 SIC manufacturing sectors during two periods (1991-1999 & 1999-2011). All regressions are
weighted by start-of-period employment share of the sector and include decadal dummies. All regressions include controls of
sectoral dummies, trend, and industry initial conditions.
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Table 4: Summary of Employment Effects
1991-2007 1991-2011
Specification 1991-1999 1999-2007 1991-2007 1991-1999 1999-2011 1991-2011
OTH
Import -124 -547 -671 -202 -513 -715
Export 735 463 1198 740 489 1229
Net 613 -71 542 550 -3 547
OTH & TAR
Import -92 -558 -650 -111 -533 -644
Export 718 453 1171 607 411 1018
Net 625 -96 529 497 -117 379
Note: This table reports the employment effects of US exports and imports at industry level. The top panel use only OTH
instruments, with the left covering 1991-2007 and the right panel covering 1991-2011. The bottom panel use both OTH and
TAR instruments. Detailed regressions and the associated first stages for each specification are reported in the appendix Table
A.2 - A.9.
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Table 5: US Trade Exposure and Other Labor Market Outcome, 1991-2007
CBP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Emp. Num Estabs. Emp Per Estab. Real Wage Bill Real Wage
∆ Global Exports 0.59∗∗∗ 0.25 0.34∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.19) (0.16) (0.15) (0.21) (0.06)
∆ CHN Imports -0.77∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.15) (0.08) (0.12) (0.15) (0.05)
∆ Non-CHN Imports 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.01
(0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12) (0.02)
Observations 784 784 784 784 784
R2 0.579 0.221 0.467 0.535 0.686
NBER
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prod. Emp. Non-Prod. Emp. Real Prod. Wage Real Non-Prod. Wage Real shipments
∆ Global Exports 0.59∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.11 0.60
(0.21) (0.18) (0.07) (0.09) (0.69)
∆ CHN Imports -0.79∗∗∗ -0.66∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.13∗ -0.30
(0.16) (0.14) (0.07) (0.07) (0.33)
∆ Non-CHN Imports 0.18 0.19∗ -0.06 0.02 0.34
(0.13) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04) (0.35)
Observations 768 768 768 768 768
R2 0.607 0.459 0.481 0.453 0.458
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on three digit SIC industries. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The sample from CBP dataset includes 784 obs: 392 SIC manufacturing industries during two periods (1991-1999 & 1999-2007).
The sample from the NBER-CES dataset include 768 obs: 384 SIC manufacturing sectors during two periods. All regressions
are weighted by start-of-period employment share of the industry and include decadal dummies and sectoral controls. For all
regressions, we use the full set of OTH and TAR terms as IVs.
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Table 6: US Trade Exposure and Local Employment, 1991-2011
Overall Employment 1991-2011 Overall Employment 1991-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CHNimport -1.10** -1.08** -1.02** -0.85** -0.95** -0.98**
(0.50) (0.45) (0.44) (0.35) (0.37) (0.38)
ROWimport -0.27 -0.28 -0.23 -0.52
(0.25) (0.26) (0.37) (0.38)
USexport 0.83** 0.98*** 1.14** 1.43***
(0.37) (0.36) (0.52) (0.55)
N 1444 1444 1444 784 784 784
# of IV 1 6 8 1 6 8
First Stage SW F stat 66.36 23.05 15.37 9.35 4.66 3.27
Hansen J 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
Predicted Job Change (1,000) 1991-1999
China Import -481 -473 -444 -372 -415 -428
ROW Import -588 -614 -498 -1127
Export 1222 1437 1669 2094
Net Change 161 379 755 539
Predicted Job Change (1,000) 1999-2011
China Import -1550 -1521 -1430 -1196 -1337 -1379
ROW Import -206 -216 -175 -395
Export 1019 1199 1392 1746
Net Change -709 -447 -119 -28
Predicted Job Change (1,000) 1991-2011
China Import -2031 -1994 -1874 -1567 -1752 -1807
ROW Import -795 -830 -673 -1522
Export 2240 2636 3061 3840
Net Change -548 -68 636 511
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on commuting zones. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Columns (1)-(3) following Acemoglu et al. (2016) and use 722 commuting zones over two stacked subperiods (1991-1999, and
1999-2011). All regressions are weighted by start-of-period population share of the commuting zone and include controls for
initial czone manufacturing employment share, US census regions dummies, and a time dummy for the second period. Column
(1) use OTH instrument for China import shock, column (2) use both OTH and ROW instruments for China imports, ROW
imports, and US global exports shocks, column (3) use the same instruments for import shocks, but use OTH and TAR exports
to the rest of world (ROW) and to China as instruments for US global exports. Columns (4)-(6) adopt the approach by
Borusyak et al. (2018) to transform the CZ level regression to a weighted industry level regression, which corrects the standard
errors. Lower panels present the firststage F statistics for excluded instruments and predicted employment changes due to trade
shocks (We follow Acemoglu et al.(2016) and take the discount factor = 0.56).
40
Table 7: US Trade Exposure and Local Employment, 1991-2011
Sectoral Employment, 1991-2011
(1) (2) (3)
CHNimport × 1{exposed sector} -1.41*** -1.42*** -1.35***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
CHNimport × 1{nonexposed tradable sector} 0.08 0.10 0.10
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
CHNimport × 1{nonexposed nontradable sector} 0.23 0.24 0.24
(0.38) (0.36) (0.35)
ROWimport × 1{exposed sector} 0.11 0.12
(0.11) (0.10)
ROWimport × 1{nonexposed tradable sector} 0.13* 0.12**
(0.07) (0.06)
ROWimport × 1{nonexposed nontradable sector} -0.50** -0.53**
(0.22) (0.23)
USexport × 1{exposed sector} -0.10 -0.00
(0.14) (0.13)
USexport × 1{nonexposed tradable sector} -0.16 -0.15
(0.10) (0.10)
USexport × 1{nonexposed nontradable sector} 1.10*** 1.13***
(0.35) (0.34)
N 4332 4332 4332
All instruments are interacted with three sectoral dummies
number of IVs 3 18 24
Predicted Job Change (1,000) 1991-1999
China Import × 1{exposed sector} -615 -619 -592
China Import × 1{nonexposed tradable sector} 34 42 44
China Import × 1{nonexposed nontradable sector} 100 105 104
ROW Import × 1{exposed sector} 228 266
ROW Import × 1{nonexposed tradable sector} 275 270
ROW Import × 1{nonexposed nontradable sector} -1091 -1150
US export × 1{exposed sector} -153 -1
US export × 1{nonexposed tradable sector} -237 -221
US export × 1{nonexposed nontradable sector} 1611 1659
Predicted Job Change (1,000), 1999-2011
China Import × 1{exposed sector} -1981 -1993 -1906
China Import × 1{nonexposed tradable sector} 109 135 140
China Import × 1{nonexposed nontradable sector} 323 337 335
ROW Import × 1{exposed sector} 80 93
ROW Import × 1{nonexposed tradable sector} 96 95
ROW Import × 1{nonexposed nontradable sector} -383 -404
US export × 1{exposed sector} -127 -1
US export × 1{nonexposed tradable sector} -198 -185
US export × 1{nonexposed nontradable sector} 1344 1384
Predicted Job Change (1,000) 1991-2011
China Import × 1{exposed sector} -2597 -2612 -2498
China Import × 1{nonexposed tradable sector} 142 176 184
China Import × 1{nonexposed nontradable sector} 423 441 440
ROW Import × 1{exposed sector} 307 359
ROW Import × 1{nonexposed tradable sector} 371 365
ROW Import × 1{nonexposed nontradable sector} -1473 -1554
US export × 1{exposed sector} -280 -1
US export × 1{nonexposed tradable sector} -435 -406
US export × 1{nonexposed nontradable sector} 2955 3043
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on commuting zones. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Sample includes 722 commuting zones over two stacked subperiods (1991-1999, and 1999-2011). All regressions are weighted
by start-of-period population share of the commuting zone and include controls for initial czone manufacturing employment
share, US census regions dummies, and a time dummy for the second period. Column (1) use OTH instrument for China
import shock, column (2) use both OTH and ROW instruments for China imports, ROW imports, and US global exports
shocks, column (3) use the same instruments for import shocks, but use OTH and TAR exports to the rest of world (ROW)
and to China as instruments for US global exports. Lower panels present the firststage F statistics for excluded instruments
and predicted employment changes due to trade shocks (We follow Acemoglu et al.(2016) and take the discount factor = 0.56).
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